Książka Revisiting South Africa’s Nuclear Weapons Program: Its History, Dismantlement, and Lessons for Today
Davida Albrighta i Andrei Stricker jest jednym z najgęstszych źródłowo opracowań o południowoafrykańskim programie jądrowym.

Poniżej zebrano podsumowanie literatury zewnętrznej, jako uzupełnienie artykułu Program jądrowy RPA: sześć bomb uranowych, Pelindaba, Valindaba i dobrowolna likwidacja arsenału.

Rozdział 1. Kładzenie fundamentów

Laying the Foundation

  • A. R. Newby Fraser, Chain Reaction: Twenty Years of Nuclear Research i Development in South Africa (Pretoria: Atomic Energy Board, 1979). Choć książka została napisana z wyraźnym zamiarem ukrycia istnienia programu nuklearnych ładunków wybuchowych i nosi ślady stronniczości typowej dla quasi-oficjalnej historii programu, nadal zawiera wiele użytecznych i skądinąd trudno dostępnych informacji o wczesnej historii południowoafrykańskiego programu jądrowego.
  • Johann Viljoen i Deon Smith, The Birth, Life, i Death of South Africa’s Nuclear Weapons Program, niepublikowany maszynopis zamówiony przez Institute for Science i International Security, 1999.
  • Daniel M. Kemp, Pieter J. Bredell, A. Albert Ponelis, i Einar Ronander, “Uranium Enrichment Technologies in South Africa” (referat przedstawiony podczas International Symposium on Isotope Separation i Chemical Exchange Uranium Enrichment, Tokyo Institute of Technology, Tokyo, Japan, October 29-November 1, 1990).
  • Chain Reaction, dz. cyt., s. 40.
  • Prime Minister P.W. Botha, Projekt przemówienia premiera P.W. Bothy na otwarcie Kentron Circle, File nr 13/2/8/C, May 4, 1981, po afrykanersku, oryginał w: Nic von Wielligh i Lydia von Wielligh-Steyn, Die Bom (Pretoria: Litera Publikasies, 2014), Appendix, przetłumaczone przez Schreiber Translations, Inc. for Institute for Science i International Security, July 7, 2015. Zob. też the English version, The Bomb (Pretoria: Litera Publications, 2015).
  • Chain Reaction, dz. cyt., s. 52.
  • Chain Reaction, dz. cyt., s. 49.
  • Chain Reaction, dz. cyt., s. 50.
  • Report of the Secretary-General, Department of Political i Security Council Affairs, UN Center for Disarmament, South Africa’s Plan i Capability in the Nuclear Field (New York: United Nations, 1981), s. 15; i Chain Reaction, dz. cyt., s. 62.
  • Chain Reaction, dz. cyt., s. 8.
  • Congressional Research Service, Library of Congress, Nuclear Proliferation Factbook (Washington, D.C.: US Government Printing Office, 1977), s. 317 i 319.
  • Jim Hoagland, “South Africa, With US Aid, Near A-Bomb,” The Washington Post, February 16, 1977.
  • Chain Reaction, dz. cyt., s. 8.
  • Renfrew Christie in South Africa’s History, na Nuclear History Program, Fourth International Conference, Sofia-Antipolis, Nice, France, June 23-27, 1993; cytując A. J. A. Roux, Proposed Atomic Energy Research i Development Programme for South Africa (Pretoria: Council for Scientific i Industrial Research (CSIR), 1958), s. 68.
  • Proposed Atomic Energy Research i Development Programme, dz. cyt., s. 69.
  • “South Africa, With US Aid,” dz. cyt.
  • Chain Reaction, dz. cyt., s. 95.
  • Chain Reaction, dz. cyt., s. 95.
  • Chain Reaction, dz. cyt., s. 96.
  • Chain Reaction, dz. cyt., s. 97.
  • Chain Reaction, dz. cyt., s. 116.
  • The Export Reorganization Act, 1975: przesłuchania przed Committee on Government Operations, United States Senate, 94th Congress (April 21, 30, i May 1, 1975), s. 102.
  • Chain Reaction, dz. cyt., s. 124.
  • Chain Reaction, dz. cyt., s. 35 i 124.
  • Chain Reaction, dz. cyt., s. 125.
  • The Export Reorganization Act, 1975, dz. cyt., s. 102.
  • N. von Wielligh i N. E. Whiting, “Experience of an Ex (de facto) Nuclear Weapon State with the Application of Post-Iraq Safeguards,” International Nuclear Safeguards 1994: Vision for the Future (Vienna: International Atomic Energy Agency, 1994).
  • Tielman de Waal, “South Africa’s Past Nuclear Program” (referat przedstawiony podczas a press briefing in South Africa, April 6, 1995).
  • Barbara Rogers i Zdenek Červenka, The Nuclear Axis (New York: Times Books, 1978), s. 207, cytując Japan Times, August 8, 1970.
  • Director of Central Intelligence, Trends in South Africa’s Nuclear Security Policies i Programs: National Intelligence Estimate, October 5, 1984, declassified version, s. 8.
  • http://www.osti.gov/scitech/biblio/4716026-use-nuclear-explosives-waterresources-development-arid-regions Zob. też Johann V. Retief’s 1971 AEB report (in Afrikaans) Seismic damage i the economy of the use of nuclear explosions. Abstract: One of the most important restrictions on the constructive use of nuclear explosions is the damage caused to buildings i structures situated na great distances around the explosion as a result of the seismic waves generated. The effect of seismic damage on the economy of the use of nuclear explosions in general is investigated. Results of the investigation are applied to conditions in South Africa. Various phases in the mechanism of seismic damage are discussed, namely generation by the explosion, propagation by the earth’s crust, amplification by the geological structure of foundations i damage to structures. Predictions are made of reaction spectra as a function of explosive force, explosive depth, placing material i distance to the observation point. The nature, extent i cost of seismic damage as a function of distance i population of urban centers i density of rural population are stimulated. Information on population distribution in South Africa are analyzed, i areas where explosions can be detonated without serious seismic damage are indicated with the aid of predictions of the cost of seismic damage. Charges with an explosive force of 10 to 100 kt can be detonated over large areas in South Africa, but bigger charges (1000 kt) are restricted to the sparsely populated areas of the Northern i Northwestern Cape. See http://www.osti.gov/scitech/ biblio/4395627-seismic-damage-economy-use-nuclear-explosions
  • cyt. za: The Nuclear Axis, dz. cyt., s. 207-8, cytując The Star (Johannesburg), January 17, 1970.
  • The information about the lithium, deuterium, tritium tablet is from “A Brief Overview of the Development of Nuclear Explosive Devices in South Africa,” by Nic von Wielligh, May 1993.
  • Zob. na przykład: Christie, South Africa’s History, dz. cyt.; The Nuclear Axis, dz. cyt.; or David Fig, “The Road to Koeberg: International Support for the Establishment of the South African Nuclear Industry,” Africa Seminar, University of Cape Town, September 15, 1993.
  • Peter Liberman, “The Rise i Fall of the South African Bomb,” International Security, t. 26, nr 2, Fall 2001, p 52.
  • Projekt przemówienia na otwarcie Kentron Circle, dz. cyt.
  • Projekt przemówienia na otwarcie Kentron Circle, dz. cyt.
  • wywiad z South African physicist by one of authors.
  • cyt. za: Nuclear Axis, dz. cyt., s. 211, dz. cyt. cytując Southern Africa, March 5, 1960.
  • cyt. za: Nuclear Axis, dz. cyt., s. 211, dz. cyt. cytując Southern Africa, January 5, 1962.
  • cyt. za: J. E. Spence, “The Republic of South Africa: Proliferation i the Politics of an ‘Outward Movement,” in Robert M. Lawrence i Joel Larus, eds. Nuclear Proliferation Phase II (Lawrence, Kansas: University Press of Kansas, 1974).
  • cyt. za: Nuclear Axis, dz. cyt., s. 211, cytując Cape Times, February 19, 1965.
  • cyt. za: “The Republic of South Africa,” dz. cyt.
  • Cited in Nuclear Axis, dz. cyt., s. 212
  • “The Rise i Fall,” op cit., s. 50-53.
  • “The Rise i Fall,” op cit., s. 50-53.
  • wywiad z Viljoen with one of the authors.

Rozdział 2. Rozwój urządzeń jądrowych

Developing Nuclear Devices

  • Hannes Steyn, Richardt van der Walt, i Jan van Loggerenberg, Armament i Disarmament: South Africa’s Nuclear Weapons Experience (Pretoria: Network Publishers, 2003), s. 38-39.
  • Armament i Disarmament: South Africa’s Nuclear Weapons Experience, dz. cyt., s. 39.
  • wywiad z André Buys, January 23, 2003.
  • Armament i Disarmament: South Africa’s Nuclear Weapons Experience, dz. cyt., s. 39.
  • Fax from Armscor to Mark Hibbs, Nuclear Fuel, April 27, 1993.
  • Frank V. Pabian, “The South African Denuclearization Exemplar,” Nonproliferation Review, 2015, t. 22, nr 1, s. 27-52. http://www. tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/10736700.2015.1071969
  • Pabian, “The South African Denuclearization Exemplar,” dz. cyt.
  • Atomic Energy Corporation, “Tritium Programme,” unpublished, bez daty (about 1993).
  • Israeli Friends: Secret South African--Israeli Nuclear Cooperation (Washington, D.C.: Institute for Science i International Security, May 1, 1994). http://isis-- online.org/uploads/isis--reports/documents/Israeli_friends.pdf Zob. też “Tritium Programme,” dz. cyt.
  • Timothy McDonnell, “International Conference: the Historical Dimensions of South Africa’s Nuclear Weapons Program” (Washington, D.C.: The Wilson Center, January 4, 2013). https://www.wilsoncenter.org/article/international-- conference--the--historical--dimensions--south--africas--nuclear--weapons--program

Rozdział 3. Pozyskiwanie wysoko wzbogaconego uranu

Getting Highly Enriched Uranium

  • A. R. Newby--Fraser, Chain Reaction: Twenty Years of Nuclear Research i Development in South Africa (Pretoria: Atomic Energy Board, 1979), s. 102.
  • Newby--Fraser, Chain Reaction, dz. cyt., s. 93.
  • A. J. A. Roux i W. L. Grant, “Uranium Enrichment in South Africa,” Nuclear Energy Maturity, Proceedings of the European Nuclear Conference, Paris, April 21-25, 1975. Zob. też Newby--Fraser, Chain Reaction, dz. cyt., s. 106; i Manson Benedict, Thomas H. Pigford, i Hans Wolfgang Levi, Nuclear Chemical Engineering (New York: McGraw--Hill Book Co., 1981), s. 888-95.
  • wywiad z Anthony Jackson, February 1994. Zob. też Daniel Kemp, Pieter Bredell, A. Albert Ponellis, i Einar Ronander, “Uranium Enrichment Technologies in South Africa,” Atomic Energy Corporation of South Africa, Ltd. (referat przedstawiony podczas the International Symposium on Isotope Separation i Chemical Exchange Uranium Enrichment, Tokyo, Japan, October 29 – November 1, 1990). Whether the element itself is actually declassified is unclear. On a 1994 visit to the Y Plant, one of the authors was first told by senior safeguards officials that he could not see the separating element because it was secret. But another senior official allowed him to examine one.
  • Newby--Fraser, Chain Reaction, dz. cyt., s. 92-94.
  • Johann Viljoen i Deon Smith, The Birth, Life, i Death of South Africa’s Nuclear Weapons Program, niepublikowany maszynopis zamówiony przez Institute for Science i International Security, 1999.
  • Viljoen i Smith, The Birth, Life, i Death of South Africa’s Nuclear Weapons Program, dz. cyt.
  • przesłuchania dotyczące S. 1439 to Reorganize Certain Export Functions of the Federal Government to Promote More Efficient i Effective Administration of Such Functions, US Senate, Committee on Government Operations, 94th Congress, 2nd session (January 19, 20, 29, 30, i March 9, 1976) (Washington: US Government Printing Office, 1976), s. 1237-38; James T. Lynn, Director, Office of Management i Budget, Executive Office of the President, “Response to Senate Government Operations Committee Inquiry Dated July 15, 1975,” September 15, 1975, discussing the Y Plant.
  • Frank V. Pabian, “The South African Denuclearization Exemplar,” Nonproliferation Review, 2015, t. 22, nr 1, s. 27-52. http://www. tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/10736700.2015.1071969
  • Zob. też Kemp, Bredell, Ponellis, i Ronander, “Uranium Enrichment Technologies in South Africa,” dz. cyt. Figure 1 in this paper shows this radial effect in a basic separating element.
  • wywiad z Jackson in South Africa, February 1994.
  • Waldo Stumpf, “South Africa's Nuclear Weapons Program,” bez daty. Zob. też Kemp, Bredell, Ponellis, i Ronander, “Uranium Enrichment Technologies in South Africa,” dz. cyt.; i International Atomic Energy Agency ([IAEA](/safeguards-jako-metrologia-rachunek-materialowy-inspekcje-i-monitoring-obiektow-jadrowych.html)), South Africa's Nuclear Capabilities (GC(XXXV)/RES/567), IAEA document GC(XXXVI)/1015, Vienna, September 4, 1992.
  • According to Jackson, the output of the plant should have been about 20,000 [SWU](/kalkulatory/swu/)/yr.
  • Roux i Grant, “Uranium Enrichment in South Africa,” dz. cyt.; i Benedict et al., Nuclear Chemical Engineering, dz. cyt., s. 889.
  • The figure for the Y Plant is taken from Barbara Rogers i Zdenek Červenka, The Nuclear Axis (New York: Times Books, 1978), s. 186. Waldo Stumpf, head of the Atomic Energy Corporation, stated that the total capital costs for the construction of the Y Plant amounted to 200 million Rand or 60 million USD in 1993 exchange rates. However, he did not make it clear whether that 200 million Rand figure included R&D costs or had been corrected to 1993 values of the Rand, which is the approximate date of his statement. See Stumpf, “South Africa’s Nuclear Weapons Program,” bez daty. If the 200 million Rand represents the actual uncorrected expenditures to build the Y Plant, then this value would correspond to about 300 million USD using the exchange rates in late 1974.
  • Newby--Fraser, Chain Reaction, dz. cyt., s. 113.
  • Frank Barnaby, “Nuclear South Africa,” New Scientist, October 19, 1978.
  • przesłuchania dotyczące S. 1439 to Reorganize Certain Export Functions of the Federal Government, dz. cyt.
  • przesłuchania dotyczące S. 1439 to Reorganize Certain Export Functions of the Federal Government, dz. cyt., s. 1232.
  • przesłuchania dotyczące S. 1439 to Reorganize Certain Export Functions of the Federal Government, dz. cyt., s. 1226.
  • The State versus Daniel Geiges i Gerhard Wisser, Summary of Substantial Facts, High Court of South Africa, bez daty. Zob. też Albright, Peddling Peril (New York: Free Press, 2010).
  • P. Mayfarth, “Special Compressors for Uranium Enrichment,” Sulzer Technical Review, April 1986.
  • Newby--Fraser, Chain Reaction, dz. cyt., s. 111.
  • David Fishlock, “South African Energy,” Report przygotowane dla Congressional Research Service of the Library of Congress, September 1976. At the time, Fishlock was Science Editor w London Financial Times.
  • cyt. za: Fishlock, “South African Energy,” dz. cyt.
  • Jim Hoagland, “S. Africa, With US Aid, Near A--Bomb,” The Washington Post, February 16, 1977.
  • Zob. na przykład: Benedict et al. Nuclear Chemical Engineering; or W. L. Grant, J. J. Wannenburg, i P. C. Haarhoff, “The Cascade Technique for the South African Enrichment Process,” Developments in Uranium Enrichment, AIChI Symposium Series, t. 73, nr 169, s. 20-24.
  • E. W. Becker, et al., “Physics i Technology of Separation Nozzle Process,” Nuclear Energy Maturity, Proceedings of the European Nuclear Conference, Paris, April 21-25, 1975.
  • Newby--Fraser, Chain Reaction, dz. cyt., s. 105.
  • Barbara Rogers i Zdenek Červenka, Nuclear Axis, s. 207, cytując Japan Times, August 8, 1970, s. 84.
  • Newby--Fraser, Chain Reaction, dz. cyt., s. 105.
  • Zob. też Roux i Grant, “Uranium Enrichment in South Africa,” dz. cyt.
  • Rogers et al., Nuclear Axis, dz. cyt., s. 70-74.
  • Rogers et al., Nuclear Axis, dz. cyt., s. 69-70.
  • Rogers et al., Nuclear Axis, dz. cyt., s. 69.
  • Kemp et al., “Uranium Enrichment Technologies in South Africa,” dz. cyt.
  • J. Jones, “South Africa Enrichment Plant Now Commercial, AEC Head Says,” Nucleonics Week, January 23, 1992.
  • P. J. Ventor, “Prospects for the South African Front--end Nuclear Fuel Cycle Industry,” International Conference on Enrichment, sponsored by the US Council for Energy Awareness, Washington, D.C., June 13-15, 1993.
  • The Y Plant had a complicated operating cycle, which included batch recycling, permitting total reflux na different parts of the cycle, i a complicated Pelsakon gas pumping system (pumping gas forward, then holding it before back--pumping the gas briefly).
  • This discussion of chemical reactions is based, unless otherwise noted, on G. J. Leuner, Summary Report on the Y Plant Chemical Loss Problem from January 1978 until August 1979, Atomic Energy Corporation, South Africa, July 1993.
  • A. J. A. Roux, W. L. Grant, R. A. Barbour, R. S. Loubser, i J. J. Wannenburg, “Development i Progress of the South African Enrichment Plant,” International Conference on Nuclear Power i Its Fuel Cycle, Salzburg, Austria, May 2-13, 1977, IAEA, IAEA--CN-36/300.
  • Mass balance considerations would provide a difference of 47.6 kilograms of uranium 235 that must be explained via losses. However, approximately 40.3 kilograms of uranium 235 could be accounted for from a variety of loss mechanisms. See Summary Report on the Y Plant Chemical Loss Problem from January 1978 until August 1979, dz. cyt.
  • Because the total amount of uranium on the filters w high end of the cascade was relatively small, the blackish green flecks were not that noticeable compared to the filters w lower end where the filter would appear green when the filters system was dismantled. Initially, the reaction products were khaki in color but turned green on exposure to air.
  • Summary Report on the Y Plant Chemical Loss Problem from January 1978 until August 1979, dz. cyt.
  • David Albright, Highly Enriched Uranium (HEU) Inventories in South Africa, status as of end of 2014 (Washington, D.C.: Institute for Science i International Security, January 31, 2015). http://isis--online.org/uploads/ isis--reports/documents/Highly_Enriched_Uranium_Inventories_in_South_ Africa_November_2015.pdf

Rozdział 4. Wyłonienie wojskowego programu jądrowego

Emergence of a Military Nuclear Program

  • Hannes Steyn, Richardt van der Walt, i Jan van Loggerenberg, Armament i Disarmament: South Africa’s Nuclear Weapons Experience (Pretoria: Network Publishers, 2003), s. 41.
  • Armament i Disarmament, dz. cyt., s. 41.
  • wywiad z Dieter Gerhardt, March 9, 1994.
  • Armament i Disarmament, dz. cyt., s. 42.
  • Murray Marder i Don Oberdorfer, “How West, Soviets Acted to Defuse S. African A--Test,” The Washington Post, August 28, 1977, s. Al.
  • list od US Secretary of State Cyrus Vance to South African Minister of Foreign Affairs R.F. Botha, August 19, 1977. Letter available in Nic von Wielligh i Lydia von Wielligh--Steyn, The Bomb (Pretoria: Litera Publications, 2015) i na http://digitalarchive.wilsoncenter.org/document/114153
  • cyt. za: Mitchell Reiss, Bridled Ambition: Why Countries Constrain Their Nuclear Capabilities (Washington, D.C.: The Wilson Center, 1995), s. 9-10.
  • Armament i Disarmament, dz. cyt., s. 42. For the US request to inspect the site, see August 19th letter from Vance to Botha, dz. cyt.
  • Armament i Disarmament, dz. cyt., s. 42.
  • Armament i Disarmament, dz. cyt., s. 42.
  • Prime Minister P.W. Botha, Projekt przemówienia na otwarcie Kentron Circle, May 4, 1981, po afrykanersku. oryginał w: Nic von Wielligh i Lydia von Wielligh-- Steyn, Die Bom (South Africa: Litera Puasies, 2014), Appendix, przetłumaczone przez Schreiber Translations, Inc. for Institute for Science i International Security, July 7, 2015.
  • cyt. za: Director of Central Intelligence, Trends in South Africa's Nuclear Security Policies i Programs, National Intelligence Estimate, October 5, 1984, declassified version.
  • Projekt przemówienia na otwarcie Kentron Circle, dz. cyt.
  • The Portuguese military seized power in Lisbon in April 1974 i decided to abandon Portugal's colonies, Angola i Mozambique, after more than a decade of failing to subdue indigenous nationalist forces.
  • Christopher Andrew, For the President's Eyes Only (New York: HarperCollins Publishers, 1995), s. 417.
  • Chester Crocker, High Noon in Southern Africa (New York: W. W. Norton & Company, 1992), s. 50.
  • Crocker, High Noon in Southern Africa, dz. cyt., s. 56.
  • Interviews with former members of the South African nuclear weapons program, February 1994.
  • Director of Central Intelligence, Trends in South Africa's Nuclear Security Policies, dz. cyt.
  • Projekt przemówienia na otwarcie Kentron Circle, dz. cyt.
  • wywiad z a senior official close to the IAEA knowledgeable about Slabber’s i other South Africans statements to the IAEA in 1993 following President de Klerk’s announcement.
  • Timothy McDonnell, “International Conference: the Historical Dimensions of South Africa’s Nuclear Weapons Program” (Washington, D.C.: The Wilson Center, January 4, 2013). https://www.wilsoncenter.org/article/international-- conference--the--historical--dimensions--south--africas--nuclear--weapons--program
  • wywiad z a senior official close to the IAEA knowledgeable about Slabber’s i other South Africans statements, dz. cyt.
  • Armament i Disarmament, dz. cyt., s. 43.
  • Armament i Disarmament, dz. cyt., s. 42
  • Armament i Disarmament, dz. cyt., s. 41.
  • Presentation to Witvlei Committee: Kramat Capability: Current Status i Further Developments, by Lt. Gen. F.E.C. van den Berg, Chairman, Coordinating Sub--Committee, September 3, 1987, po afrykanersku, oryginał w: Die Bom, dz. cyt.
  • Denis Venter, “South Africa i the International Controversy Surrounding its Nuclear Capability,” Politikon, t. 5, nr 1, June 1978; i M. Hough, “Deterrence i Deterrence Interaction with Reference to the South African Situation,” Politikon, t. 5, nr 1, June 1978.
  • This type of opposition to signing the [NPT](/strategie-proliferacji-sprint-ukrycie-hedging-i-proliferacja-pod-krysza.html) was also expressed in a secret May 14, 1981 memorandum from the South African embassy in Washington, D.C., which was leaked to the US--based non--governmental organization Trans Africa: “It must be realized that South Africa is threatened by the USSR i its associates i by certain African countries with Soviet support i encouragement. South Africa has no hope of any assistance from the UN in case of attack. On the contrary, it is continually being threatened with action under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations. While this state of affairs continues, South Africa cannot in the interest of its own security sign the NPT i thus set the minds of its would--be attackers na rest, allowing them to proceed freely with their plans against us.”
  • Lukas Daniel Barnard, “Die Afskrikkingstrategie van Kernwapens” (“The Deterrent Strategy of Nuclear Weapons”), Journal for Contemporary History i International Relations, t. 2, nr 2, Sept 1977, s. 74-97 (translated into English).
  • UN Security Council, “The Question of South Africa,” S/RES/418 (1977), November 7, 1977.
  • During the Reagan administration, certain limited nuclear assistance occurred.
  • Waldo Stumpf, “South Africa's Nuclear Weapons Program,” bez daty, p.
  • An edited version of this paper is in Kathleen C. Bailey, Weapons of Mass Destruction: Costs versus Benefits (New Delhi: Manohar Publishers i Distributers, 1994), s. 63-81.
  • Tielman de Waal, “South Africa's Past Nuclear Program” (referat przedstawiony podczas a press briefing in South Africa, April 6, 1995).
  • Stumpf, “South Africa's Nuclear Weapons Program,” dz. cyt.; i Interviews with former members of the nuclear weapons program.
  • Director of Central Intelligence, The 22 September 1979 Event, Interagency Intelligence Memorandum, December 1979, Declassified version obtained through Freedom of Information Act by Natural Resources Defense Council i released July 10, 1990.
  • Armaments i Disarmament, dz. cyt., s. 43.
  • Armscor officials, personal interviews 1994 i 1995; i Reiss, Bridled Ambition, dz. cyt., s. 9. These discussions involved only senior officials. The AEB personnel involved in the nuclear explosive program were told of the formal shift to a military emphasis in November 1978. Zob. też Projekt przemówienia na otwarcie Kentron Circle, dz. cyt. Armament i Disarmament, dz. cyt., s. 43.
  • Armscor officials, personal interviews 1994 i 1995; i Reiss, Bridled Ambition, dz. cyt., s. 9. These discussions involved only senior officials. The AEB personnel involved in the nuclear explosive program were told of the formal shift to a military emphasis in November 1978. Zob. też Projekt przemówienia na otwarcie Kentron Circle, dz. cyt. Armament i Disarmament, dz. cyt., s. 43.
  • Projekt przemówienia na otwarcie Kentron Circle, dz. cyt.
  • wywiad z a former member of nuclear weapons program, Spring 1994.
  • Armament i Disarmament, dz. cyt., s. 74-80. The authors describe the South African nuclear weapons program more broadly i include other SADF units, in particular the ballistic missile units. As will be discussed later, South Africa planned on building nuclear warheads for a ballistic missile.

Rozdział 5. Zakład Kentron Circle

Kentron Circle Facility

  • Prime Minister P.W. Botha, Projekt przemówienia na otwarcie Kentron Circle, May 4, 1981, po afrykanersku. oryginał w: Nic von Wielligh i Lydia von Wielligh-- Steyn, Die Bom (South Africa: Litera Puasies, 2014), Appendix, przetłumaczone przez Schreiber Translations, Inc. for Institute for Science i International Security, July 7, 2015.
  • Projekt przemówienia na otwarcie Kentron Circle, dz. cyt.
  • wywiad z André Buys, July 31, 2002.
  • South Africa's nuclear explosive program in the 1970s was widely known about. In 1984, the CIA wrote: “Evidence that South Africa has developed a significant nuclear explosives capability is substantial i compelling.” [Director of Central Intelligence, Trends in South Africa's Nuclear Security Policies i Programs, National Intelligence Estimate, October 5, 1984, declassified version]. However, this report recognized that South Africa imposed tighter security over its nuclear explosives program after the 1977 Kalahari incident. In particular, the authors of the report appeared not to know that South Africa had embarked on a program to produce deliverable nuclear weapons, although they recognized correctly that it possibly could have done so. A related issue is when Western intelligence agencies discovered the true purpose of the Circle building. US satellites likely picked up the construction of Circle, but one official said that the US intelligence agencies had misunderstood Circle's true purpose, perhaps for the first five or six years of its operation. Certainly, by 1988 or 1989, the true purpose of Circle was known, he added.
  • Johann Viljoen i Deon Smith, The Birth, Life, i Death of South Africa’s Nuclear Weapons Program, niepublikowany maszynopis zamówiony przez Institute for Science i International Security, 1999.
  • Hannes Steyn, Richardt van der Walt, i Jan van Loggerenberg, Armament i Disarmament: South Africa’s Nuclear Weapons Experience (Pretoria: Network Publishers, 2003), s. 75.
  • Kramat Capability: Current Status i Further Development, part of September 3 1987 submission to the Witvlei Control Committee (WBK), po afrykanersku. oryginał w: Die Bom, dz. cyt. Zob. też the English version in The Bomb (Pretoria: Litera Publications, 2015), Appendix.
  • Zob. na przykład: Armament i Disarmament, dz. cyt., s. 83-87.
  • Nic von Wielligh i Lydia von Wielligh--Steyn, The Bomb (Pretoria: Litera Publications, 2015), s. 172-173.
  • Armament i Disarmament, dz. cyt., s. 75 i 88.
  • Armament i Disarmament, dz. cyt., s. 88.
  • Director of Central Intelligence, Trends in South Africa's Nuclear Security Policies i Programs, National Intelligence Estimate, October 5, 1984, declassified version.
  • Interview by one of the authors, October 31, 1994.
  • Meeting of Ad Hoc Cabinet Committee Under the Chairmanship of the Honourable State President on Tuesday 3 September 1985 na 15H00, in The Bomb, dz. cyt., s. 480-483.
  • wywiad z Armscor officials, Circle building, February 1994.
  • Inflation Calculator: http://fxtop.com/en/inflation--calculator.php

Rozdział 6. Strategia jądrowa i rozbudowa arsenału

Nuclear Strategy and Arsenal Expansion

  • wywiad z a former member of the nuclear weapons program, October 1995.
  • Prime Minister P.W. Botha, Projekt przemówienia premiera P.W. Bothy na otwarcie Kentron Circle, File nr 13/2/8/C, May 4, 1981, po afrykanersku, oryginał w: Nic von Wielligh i Lydia von Wielligh--Steyn, Die Bom (Pretoria: Litera Puasies, 2014), Appendix, przetłumaczone przez Schreiber Translations, Inc. for Institute for Science i International Security, July 7, 2015.
  • Projekt przemówienia premiera P.W. Bothy na otwarcie Kentron Circle, dz. cyt.
  • Peter Liberman, “The Rise i Fall of the South African Bomb,” International Security, t. 26, nr 2, Fall 2001, s. 53.
  • This plan was reiterated in a 1985 meeting i referred to as the 1978 plan. See Meeting of Ad Hoc Cabinet Committee Chaired by Honorable State President, September 3, 1985, Die Bom, dz. cyt., or the English version: Nic von Wielligh i Lydia von Wielligh--Steyn, The Bomb (Pretoria: Litera Publications, 2015).
  • Projekt przemówienia premiera P.W. Bothy na otwarcie Kentron Circle, dz. cyt.
  • Liberman, “The Rise i Fall of the South African Bomb,” dz. cyt., s. 55.
  • wywiad z Buys, April 5, 2001.
  • Liberman, “The Rise i Fall of the South African Bomb,” dz. cyt., s. 56.
  • By 1984 the prime minister title was changed to State President.
  • Meeting of Ad Hoc Cabinet Committee, The Bomb, dz. cyt.
  • Liberman, “The Rise i Fall of the South African Bomb,” dz. cyt., s. 56.
  • wywiad z Buys, April 4, 2003.
  • Mitchell Reiss, Bridled Ambition: Why Countries Constrain Their Nuclear Capabilities (Washington, D.C.: The Wilson Center, 1995), s. 15-16; i wywiad z Buys, April 4, 2003.
  • Presentation to Witvlei Committee: Kramat Capability: Current Status i Further Developments, The Bomb, Appendix, dz. cyt., pp 486-496.
  • Liberman, “The Rise i Fall of the South African Bomb,” dz. cyt., s. 56-57.
  • Liberman, “The Rise i Fall of the South African Bomb,” dz. cyt., s. 56-57.
  • Witvlei means White Marsh in English. The word’s origin in unknown.
  • Meeting of Ad Hoc Cabinet Committee, The Bomb, dz. cyt.
  • Presentation to Witvlei Committee: Kramat Capability: Current Status i Further Developments, The Bomb, dz. cyt.
  • Interviews with Buys, April 4 i July 31, 2003.
  • “The Rise i Fall of the South African Bomb,” dz. cyt., s. 57-58.
  • When the rocket has a satellite payload, an apogee kick motor is affixed to the top of rocket so as to propel the satellite into low earth orbit w top of the rocket’s parabolic trajectory. When the rocket has a warhead, it is topped by a re--entry vehicle that protects the warhead as it reenters the atmosphere on the downward portion of the parabolic trajectory.
  • For more details about these sites, see Hannes Steyn, Richardt van der Walt, i Jan van Loggerenberg, Armament i Disarmament: South Africa’s Nuclear Weapons Experience (Pretoria: Network Publishers, 2003), s. 75-82.
  • Programme Dunhill: Development of a Nuclear Capability for the SADF, Decision of the Ad Hoc Cabinet Committee, April 18, 1988, The Bomb, dz. cyt., s. 497.
  • Presentation to Witvlei Committee: Kramat Capability: Current Status i Further Developments, dz. cyt.
  • Programme Dunhill: Development of a Nuclear Capability for the SADF, Decision of the Ad Hoc Cabinet Committee, The Bomb, dz. cyt., s. 497-498.
  • Program Olympic: Corroborative Notes following the briefing of the Minister of Defence in Cape Town on 27 July 1987, July 30, 1987, The Bomb, dz. cyt., s. 484-5.
  • Programme Dunhill: Development of a Nuclear Capability for the SADF, Decision of the Ad Hoc Cabinet Committee, dz. cyt.
  • Chester Crocker, High Noon in Southern Africa (New York: W.W. Norton & Company, 1992), s. 365-366.
  • Crocker, High Noon in Southern Africa, dz. cyt., s. 367.
  • High Noon in Southern Africa, dz. cyt., s. 367.
  • High Noon in Southern Africa, dz. cyt., s. 367.
  • High Noon in Southern Africa, dz. cyt., s. 372.
  • Frank Pabian, “South Africa’s Nuclear Weapon Program: Lessons for US Nonproliferation Policy,” Nonproliferation Review, Fall 1995, s. 28. https:// www.nonproliferation.org/wp--content/uploads/npr/31pabian.pdf
  • Frank V. Pabian, “The South African Denuclearization Exemplar,” Nonproliferation Review, 2015, t. 22, nr 1, s. 27-52. http://dx.doi.org/10.108 0/10736700.2015.1071969. Pabian cites a discussion na an international conference on South Africa’s nuclear weapons program held in Pretoria on December 9-12, 2012, titled “The Historical Dimensions of South Africa’s Nuclear Weapons Program.” The conference is discussed, although not this information from Pik Botha, na https://www.wilsoncenter.org/article/international--conference--the-- historical--dimensions--south--africas--nuclear--weapons--program
  • “The South African Denuclearization Exemplar,” dz. cyt.
  • “South Africa’s Nuclear Weapon Program,” dz. cyt.
  • “Pretoria Says It Can Build A Arms,” Reuters. August 13, 1988.

Rozdział 7. Laboratoria Advena Central

Advena Central Laboratories

  • Armscor, Written responses to queries by one of authors, Spring 1993.
  • DEA IOTA 2203, YouTube, February 24, 2014, https://www.youtube.com/ watch?v=P3UyXfBumAk
  • wywiad z former senior member of South Africa’s nuclear weapons program, 2003.
  • Program Olympic: Collaborative Notes Following a Briefing of the Minister of Defense in Kaapstad on July 27, 1987, dated July 30, 1987, po afrykanersku, oryginał w: Nic von Wielligh i Lydia von Wielligh--Steyn, Die Bom (South Africa: Litera Puasies, 2014), Appendix, przetłumaczone przez Schreiber Translations, Inc. for Institute for Science i International Security, July 7, 2015. Zob. też English version, The Bomb, (Pretoria: Litera Publications, 2015).
  • Johann Viljoen i Deon Smith, The Birth, Life, i Death of South Africa’s Nuclear Weapons Program, niepublikowany maszynopis zamówiony przez Institute for Science i International Security, 1999.
  • Information sheet przekazane the IAEA by South Africa, bez daty but in period immediately following President de Klerk March 1993 announcement of a prior nuclear weapons program.
  • “From Bomb--filling to Advanced R&D,” Engineering Week: ARMSCOR Annual Survey (Johannesburg, 1989), s. 22, cited in Frank Pabian, “South Africa’s Nuclear Weapon Program: Lessons for U.S. Nonproliferation Policy,” Nonproliferation Review, Fall 1995. https://www.nonproliferation.org/wp-- content/uploads/npr/31pabian.pdf
  • Jaap Boekkooi, “Whose Basements Have a Bomb?” The Star, Johannesburg, September 29, 1982, s. 29.
  • The Birth, Life, i Death of South Africa’s Nuclear Weapons Program, dz. cyt.
  • Nic von Wielligh i Lydia von Wielligh--Steyn, The Bomb, dz. cyt., s. 175.
  • Atomic Energy Corporation, “Tritium Programme,” bez daty (about 1993), unpublished.
  • “Tritium Programme,” dz. cyt.
  • Sasha Polakow--Suransky, The Unspoken Alliance (New York: Pantheon Books, 2010). See also, Die Bomb dz. cyt., which contains some of the documents in its appendix.
  • The Unspoken Alliance, dz. cyt.
  • “The Jericho Weapon System,” from CS [Lt. General R.F. Armstrong] to C SADF, date March 31, 1975, stamped top secret. The declassified document was obtained by Peter Liberman. See Liberman, “Israel i the South African Bomb,” Nonproliferation Review, Summer 2004.
  • wywiad z Dieter Gerhardt, March 9, 1994.
  • Hannes Steyn, Richardt van der Walt, i Jan van Loggerenberg, Armament i Disarmament: South Africa’s Nuclear Weapons Experience (Pretoria: Network Publishers, 2003), s. 91.
  • “Avner Cohen on Israel i South Africa,” ArmsControlWonk.com, May 24, 2010 under Israel, media--criticism by Joshua Pollack.
  • Prime Minister P.W. Botha, Projekt przemówienia premiera P.W. Bothy na otwarcie Kentron Circle, File nr 13/2/8/C, May 4, 1981, Die Bom, dz. cyt.
  • Albright, Peddling Peril (New York: Free Press, 2010), s. 105; i wywiad z former leader of gas centrifuge program.

Rozdział 8. Wycofanie programu jądrowego

Nuclear Rollback

  • Chester Crocker, High Noon in Southern Africa (New York: W.W. Norton & Company, 1992).
  • “The Geneva Protocol, 5 August 1988,” w dodatku 3, High Noon in Southern Africa, dz. cyt.
  • “Tripartite Agreement, 22 December 1988, w dodatku 6, High Noon in Southern Africa, dz. cyt. Zob. też “Bilateral Agreement, 22 December 1988,” w dodatku 5, High Noon in Southern Africa, dz. cyt.
  • For a more complete discussion of these changes see Alister Sparks, Tomorrow is Another Country (New York: Hall i Wang, 1995).
  • F.W. de Klerk, The Autobiography: The Last Trek, A New Beginning (London: Macmillan, 1998), s. 273. Zob. też Nic von Wielligh i Lydia von Wielligh-- Steyn, The Bomb (Pretoria: Litera Publications, 2015), Appendix.
  • Tomorrow is Another Country, dz. cyt., s. 88.
  • For a detailed description of this showdown between Botha i de Klerk see, Sparks, Tomorrow is Another Country, dz. cyt., s. 88-90.
  • State President F. W. de Klerk, “Speech by the State President, Mr. F. W. de Klerk, to a Joint Session of Parliament, 24 March 1993,” Transcript of speech given in Cape Town. Zob. też “De Klerk Discloses Nuclear Capability to Parliament,” FBIS--AFR-93-056, March 25, 1993, s. 5-9.
  • State President F. W. de Klerk, “Speech by the State President, Mr. F. W. de Klerk, to a Joint Session of Parliament, 24 March 1993,” dz. cyt.; “De Klerk Discloses Nuclear Capability to Parliament,” dz. cyt.
  • Transcript of speech by Waldo Stumpf, South African Embassy, Washington, D.C., July 23, 1993.
  • David Ottaway, “South Africa Agrees to Treaty Curbing Nuclear Weapons,” The Washington Post, June 28, 1991, s. A25.
  • wywiad z one of the authors, Vienna, September 1993.
  • “Report, South African Department of Foreign Affairs, 'A Balanced Approach to the NPT: Armscor/AEC Concerns Viewed from a DFA Standpoint,'” September 1, 1988, History i Public Policy Program Digital Archive, South African Foreign Affairs Archives, NPT--IAEA Agreement/ Negotiations on full--scope safeguards. Obtained i contributed by Anna-- Mart van Wyk, Monash South Africa. >http://digitalarchive.wilsoncenter. org/document/114185 or http://digitalarchive.wilsoncenter.org/assets/media_ files/000/001/671/1671.pdf
  • Mitchell Reiss, Bridled Ambition: Why Countries Constrain Their Nuclear Capabilities (Washington, D.C.: The Wilson Center, 1995), s. 22.
  • Mark Hibbs, “South Africa's Secret Nuclear Program: The Dismantling,” Nuclear Fuel, May 24, 1993, quoted in Reiss, Bridled Ambition, dz. cyt., s. 22.
  • wywiad z Armscor officials by one of the authors, 1995.
  • Hannes Steyn, Richardt van der Walt, i Jan van Loggerenberg, Armament i Disarmament: South Africa’s Nuclear Weapons Experience (Pretoria: Network Publishers, 2003), s. 98-103.
  • wywiad z one of the authors, Pelindaba, February 1994.
  • wywiad z André Buys, January 23, 2003.
  • Richard Ellis, “Pretoria Seeks Haven for its Nuclear Stocks,” The Sunday Times, August 15, 1993.
  • Zob. też Die Bomb, dz. cyt., s. 277.
  • Shirley Woodgate, “Science Must Serve Democracy — Mandela,” The Star, August 31, 1993.

Rozdział 9. Demontaż broni jądrowej

Dismantling the Nuclear Weapons

  • wywiad z senior Armscor official, October 10, 1995.
  • Waldo Stumpf, “South Africa's Nuclear Weapons Program,” bez daty, p.
  • An edited version of this paper is in Kathleen C. Bailey, Weapons of Mass Destruction: Costs versus Benefits (New Delhi: Manohar Publishers i Distributers, 1994), s. 63-81.
  • Mitchell Reiss, Bridled Ambition: Why Countries Constrain Their Nuclear Capabilities (Washington, D.C.: The Wilson Center, 1995), s. 17.
  • Following the 1994 agreement between the United States i North Korea, called the Agreed Framework, whereby North Korea would shut down its plutonium production facilities in exchange for two light water reactors worth many billions of dollars, an Armscor official expressed dismay to one of the authors that South Africa had not negotiated for something more concrete in exchange for abandoning its nuclear weapons program. A deal on the scale of the Agreed Framework would have paid a major share of the ANC government's reconstruction program. For regret about not doing so, see Hannes Steyn, Richardt van der Walt, i Jan van Loggerenberg, Armament i Disarmament: South Africa’s Nuclear Weapons Experience (Pretoria: Network Publishers: 2003), s. 102.
  • Reiss, Bridled Ambition, dz. cyt., s. 17.
  • transkrypcja wystąpienia Waldo Stumpf, South African Embassy, Washington, D.C., July 23, 1993.
  • Nic von Wielligh i Lydia von Wielligh--Steyn, The Bomb (Pretoria: Litera Publications, 2015). See s. 500-513.
  • The ‘Mantel’ Project, signed by W.E. Stumpf, CEO for the AEC i J.L. Steyn, Senior General Manager: R&D, Armscor, February 8, 1990, in The Bomb, dz. cyt., s. 507.
  • The ‘Mantel’ Project, dz. cyt.
  • Interviews with Armscor i AEC officials. See also, The Bomb, dz. cyt., s. 217 i document in appendix, s. 500-501.
  • Stumpf, Transcript of talk na South African Embassy, dz. cyt.
  • Dismantling of Nuclear Weapons, from State President to Minister of Defense, February 26, 1990, The Bomb, dz. cyt., s. 512, Since the order controlled the release of the nuclear warheads from the Circle vaults, under warhead control procedures, there should have been an identical order to the Minister of Minerals i Energy Affairs.
  • Stumpf, “South Africa's Nuclear Weapons Program,” dz. cyt., s. 14-15.
  • The Y Plant was actually shut down on February 1, 1990, before the written instructions were received from de Klerk. Decommissioning i decontamination commenced immediately afterwards.
  • Armament i Disarmament, dz. cyt., s. 99-100.
  • Armament i Disarmament, dz. cyt. s. 98.
  • Reiss, Bridled Ambition, dz. cyt., s. 18. This information was told to Reiss by Wynand Mouton, the expert who de Klerk hand--picked to audit the dismantlement process.
  • This episode was told to Reiss by Mouton, see Bridled Ambition, dz. cyt., s. 40, see footnote 66.
  • Reiss, Bridled Ambition, dz. cyt., s. 18; i IAEA, The Denuclearization of Africa, Annex 1, Attachment 1.
  • David Albright, “South Africa's Secret Nuclear Weapons” (Washington, D.C.: Institute for Science i International Security, May 1994), s. 16.
  • Reiss, Bridled Ambition, dz. cyt., s. 18-19.
  • Reiss, Bridled Ambition, dz. cyt., s. 23; i Various interviews by one of the authors with Armscor officials in 1994 i 1995.
  • wywiad z Mouton by telephone by one of the authors, October 13, 1995.
  • wywiad z Mouton, dz. cyt.
  • wywiad z Mouton, dz. cyt.
  • wywiad z Mouton, dz. cyt.; i Reiss, Bridled Ambition, dz. cyt., p.
  • There have been media reports that two workers were removed from the dismantlement program i kept under continuous surveillance when they threatened to steal nuclear materials. Mouton said that he did not think this story was true. Armscor officials have also denied this particular story, although not the underlying concern.
  • wywiad z Mouton, dz. cyt.
  • cyt. za: Reiss, Bridled Ambition, dz. cyt., s. 18.
  • Reiss, Bridled Ambition, dz. cyt., s. 18 i 40, footnote 69.
  • An irony of Mouton's involvement was that he lived within a kilometer of P. W. Botha in Wilderness, a retirement resort. Although they periodically saw each other, Mouton never talked to Botha about his role in dismantling the arsenal Botha played such a major role in creating.
  • State President F. W. de Klerk, “Speech by the State President, Mr. F. W. de Klerk to a Joint Session of Parliament, 24 March 1993,” Transcript of speech given in Cape Town. Zob. też “De Klerk Discloses Nuclear Capability to Parliament,” FBIS--AFR-93-056, March 25, 1993, s. 5-9.
  • The total amount of HEU unaccounted for, some of which was known to have been lost during processing, na Circle was higher, about 3.9 kilograms of uranium in total, containing 3.2 kilograms of uranium 235. Of this total, about 1.6 kilograms (and 1.3 kilograms of uranium 235) resulted from process losses during melting i casting operations w Circle facility.
  • wywiad z Mouton, dz. cyt.
  • Information supplied to one of the authors by Armscor officials, April i May 1993.
  • Zob. na przykład: Andre Buys, “The Conversion of South Africa's Nuclear Weapons Facilities,” Bulletin of Arms Control, Council for Arms Control i Center of Defense Studies na London University, nr 12, November 1993; i Albright, “A Curious Conversion,” Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, June 1993.
  • One of the authors took a tour of the site in August 2002 with a former Armscor official involved in the program. Many pictures in this book are from that visit.
  • cyt. za: Ann MacLachlan i Mark Hibbs, “South Africa Ready to Sign NPT if Other States in Region Do So,” Nucleonics Week, September 27, 1990.
  • David Ottaway, “South Africa Agrees to Treaty Curbing Nuclear Weapons,” The Washington Post, June 28, 1991, s. A25.
  • Stumpf, “South Africa's Nuclear Weapons Program,” dz. cyt., s. 16.
  • Stumpf, Transcript of talk na South African Embassy, dz. cyt.
  • Albright i Mark Hibbs, “The ANC i the Atom Bomb,” Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, April 1993.
  • “The ANC i the Atom Bomb,” dz. cyt.
  • Interviews with US officials, 1994-96.
  • wywiad z US official by one of the authors (Albright), 1997.
  • Steve Coll i Paul Taylor, “Tracking S. Africa’s Elusive A-- Program,” The Washington Post, March 18, 1993. https:// www.washingtonpost.com/archive/politics/1993/03/18/ tracking--s--africas--elusive--a--program/41d5a61d--d12a-4ed7-9504-8973eb92898c/
  • For a report on the Pell Report, see R. Jeffrey Smith, “Pretoria’s Candor on Nuclear Program Questioned,” The Washington Post, March 18, 1993.
  • Senator John Glenn released the Russian intelligence report detailing global proliferation of weapons of mass destruction on February 24, 1993.
  • “De Klerk Holds News Conference on Speech,” SABC TV 1 Network in English, 24 March 1993, Transcript published in FBIS--AFR-93-056, March 25, 1993.
  • “ANC Welcomes De Klerk Nuclear 'Admissions,” Johannesburg SAPA, March 24, 1993. Also in FBIS--AFR-93-056, March 25, 1995, s. 15.

Rozdział 10. Weryfikacja międzynarodowa

International Verification

  • Waldo Stumpf, “The Accession of a 'Threshold State' to the NPT: The South African Experience,” Excerpt from presentation given w Conference on Nuclear Non--Proliferation: The Challenge of a New Era, organized by the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, Washington, D.C., November 1718, 1993.
  • Mitchell Reiss, Bridled Ambition: Why Countries Constrain Their Nuclear Capabilities (Washington, D.C.: The Wilson Center, 1995), s. 19.
  • Zob. na przykład: “Right--Wing Nuke Arms Claim Denied,” The Citizen, February 16, 1995, s. 3.
  • Information Circular/153 is an agreement detailing the rules i procedures by which IAEA safeguards are carried out in non--nuclear weapon states which have signed the NPT.
  • Stumpf, Transcript of speech na South African Embassy, dz. cyt.
  • Stumpf, “The Accession of a 'Threshold State' to the NPT,” dz. cyt., s. 8.
  • Stumpf, “The Accession of a 'Threshold State' to the NPT,” dz. cyt.
  • International Atomic Energy Agency, The Structure i Content of Agreements between the Agency i States Required in Connection with the Treaty on the Non--Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, INFCIRC/153 (corrected), June 1972, paragraph 62.
  • Declassified State Department document, “South Africa: Nuclear Case Closed,” December 19, 1993. http://nsarchive.gwu.edu/NSAEBB/NSAEBB181/ sa34.pdf
  • International Atomic Energy Agency, Report on the Completeness of the Inventory of South Africa’s Nuclear Installations i Material, GC(XXXVI/1015), attachment, September 4, 1992, http://www.iaea.org/About/ Policy/GC/GC36/GC36Documents/English/gc36-1015_en.pdf
  • Report on the Completeness of the Inventory of South Africa’s Nuclear Installations i Material, dz. cyt.
  • On the floor on one side of the shade, the inspectors saw a large concrete ramp which appeared to have been cast in situ. This structure may have allowed a test device or other equipment to be wheeled over the test shaft. See “Rendering Useless South Africa’s Nuclear Test Shafts in the Kalahari Desert,” by David Albright, Paul Brannan, Zachary Laporte, Katherine Tajer, i Christina Walrond (Washington, D.C.: Institute for Science i International Security, November 29, 2011), http://isis--online.org/uploads/isis--reports/ documents/Vastrap_30November2011.pdf
  • Frank V. Pabian, “The South African Denuclearization Exemplar,” Nonproliferation Review, 2015, t. 22, nr 1, s. 27-52. http://dx.doi.org/10.108 0/10736700.2015.1071969
  • David Albright, Highly Enriched Uranium Inventories in South Africa Status as of end of 2014 (Washington, D.C.: Institute for Science i International Security, November 16, 2015). http://isis--online.org/uploads/isis--reports/ documents/Highly_Enriched_Uranium_Inventories_in_South_Africa_ November_2015.pdf. Zob. na przykład: Peter Fabricius, “SA playing both sides of the nuclear coin,” The Star, March 30, 2012.
  • Adolf von Baeckmann, Garry Dillon, i Demetrius Perricos, “Nuclear Verification in South Africa,” IAEA Bulletin, 1/1995, s. 42-48. Zob. też IAEA, South Africa's Nuclear Capabilities (GC(XXXV)/RES/567), GC(XXXVI/1015), September 4, 1992.
  • This value from an IAEA discussion about the completeness of the South African inventory also had a high degree of uncertainty attached to it.
  • AEC Declaration, March 1994. Zob. też Stumpf, Transcript of talk na South African embassy, dz. cyt. Stumpf said that the “apparent discrepancy” is “more than five times less than” 526 kilograms, which is the two sigma uncertainty in the uranium-235 content of the tails.
  • Finding these records required the AEC to contact personnel who had already left the AEC's employment.
  • Baeckmann, et al, “Nuclear Verification in South Africa,” dz. cyt.
  • In this analysis, the loss mechanism had to be modeled because the process was so complex. For example, it was sensitive to the radiation background, meaning that effect became more pronounced in higher stages of the cascade where the uranium-235 concentration was greater.
  • IAEA, The Denuclearization of South Africa, dz. cyt.
  • South Africa had informed the Director General of the IAEA in advance of the contents of de Klerk's statement, so the inspectors were prepared to conduct the visits. See IAEA, “IAEA Safeguards in South Africa,” PR 93/7, Vienna, March 24, 1993.
  • IAEA, The Denuclearization of Africa, dz. cyt., pp 3-4.
  • The log book listed each part in a device i each change to that device. The dismantling records of the nonnuclear components of the weapons were composed of brief hand--written listings of component systems dismantled from the deliverable devices. The inspectors were told that no records had been kept documenting the dismantling or destruction of the components of the Melba device or any of the pre--production experimental devices (certain series 300 models).
  • IAEA, The Denuclearization of Africa, dz. cyt., s. 11.
  • IAEA, The Denuclearization of Africa, dz. cyt., s. 9.
  • IAEA, South Africa's Nuclear Capabilities (GC(XXXV)/RES/567), dz. cyt., s. 2.
  • Because of particular characteristics of the enrichment stages in the Y Plant, this information was hard to correlate with enriched uranium output.
  • Stumpf, “The Accession of a 'Threshold State,' to the NPT,” dz. cyt., s. 11.
  • Environmental samples taken inside the Y Plant helped determine that LEU had not been used as feedstock, an action that would have significantly increased the HEU output of this facility.
  • IAEA, South Africa's Nuclear Capabilities (GC(XXXV)/RES/567), dz. cyt., s. 1.
  • Armscor officials were more open to providing procurement information but there were limits to what they could have provided because of the destruction of records of what amounted often to cases of illegal overseas procurements. During the 1990s, the United States i South Africa were engaged in settling a criminal case against Armscor’s illegal procurements in the United States. As part of that settlement, the United States asked Armscor for the records of its department of foreign procurement, which in essence was a group of smugglers. Armscor is acknowledged by senior former South African officials as having become “quite specialized in ‘sensitive procurement.’” [Armament i Disarmament, dz. cyt., s. 82]. However, according to a former senior Armscor official interviewed by one of the authors, “most documents had been destroyed long ago.”
  • This section is based on Stumpf, “The Accession of a 'Threshold State,' to the NPT,” dz. cyt., s. 12-15.
  • IAEA, Denuclearization of Africa, Attachment 1, Annex 2; i other sources.

Rozdział 11. Zabezpieczenie przed odtworzeniem programu

Ensuring Against Reversal

  • Tielman de Waal, “South Africa's Past Nuclear Program” (referat przedstawiony podczas a press briefing in South Africa, April 6, 1995), s. 6.
  • raport Dyrektora Generalnego, International Atomic Energy Agency, The Denuclearization of Africa (GC(XXXVI/RES/557), GC(XXXVII/1075), September 9, 1993, s. 8-9.
  • Szczegółowe omówienie: the Kalahari Test site dismantlement, see David Albright, Paul Brannan, Zachary Laporte, Katherine Tajer, i Christina Walrond, “Rendering Useless South Africa’s Nuclear Test Shafts in the Kalahari Desert” (Washington, D.C.: Institute for Science i International Security, November 30, 2011). http://isis--online.org/uploads/isis--reports/documents/ Vastrap_30November2011.pdf.
  • Nagranie można znaleźć pod adresem: http://isis--online.org/conferences/detail/ destruction--of--south--african--test--shafts--by--iaea--inspectors/13
  • IAEA, The Denuclearization of Africa, dz. cyt., s. 11.
  • Stumpf, “South Africa's Nuclear Weapons Program,” dz. cyt., s. 25.
  • De Waal, “South Africa's Past Nuclear Program,” dz. cyt., s. 7.
  • The new South African laws did not provide for the extradition of any person from the former weapon programs working on weapons of mass destruction in another country. If they returned to South Africa, however, they could potentially be prosecuted for violating secrecy agreements.
  • memorandum autorstwa David Albright i Kevin O’Neill, “South Africa Council on Non--Proliferation,” November 16, 1994, przekazane South African officials.
  • Więcej informacji o the development of internal compliance systems in German companies, see Albright, Peddling Peril (New York: Free Press, 2010), Chapter 11.
  • U.S. Arms Control i Disarmament Agency (ACDA) (now defunct), “Nuclear Proliferation Assessment Statement” pursuant to Section 123(a) of the Atomic Energy Act, as amended, with respect to the Proposed Agreement for Cooperation between the United States of America i the Republic of South Africa Concerning the Peaceful Uses of Nuclear Energy, bez daty, s. 7.
  • Hannes Steyn, Richardt van der Walt, i Jan van Loggerenberg, Armament i Disarmament: South Africa’s Nuclear Weapons Experience (Pretoria: Network Publishers, 2003), pp 101-103.
  • In 1991, the US government waived mandatory US sanctions against Israel as part of an agreement where Israel pledged to stop exporting missile technology to South Africa by the end of 1991.
  • On October 31, 1991, a federal grand jury in the Eastern District of Pennsylvania returned an indictment charging Armscor i others, but not Denel which did not exist until about 1992, with conspiracy to violate i with violation of the Arms Export Control Act (AECA). The Department of State therefore had reasonable cause to believe that during the period 1978 through 1989, Armscor i the other cited entities engaged in an ongoing conspiracy to export, i did export, defense articles i defense services to the Republic of South Africa i to Iraq without the requisite Department of State licenses or approvals. Effective June 8, 1994, it became the policy of the Department of State to deny all export license applications i other requests for approval involving, directly or indirectly: the Armaments Corporation of South Africa, Ltd. (a.k.a. Armscor), an agency of the South African Government; the Denel Group (Pty.) Ltd. (a.k.a. Denel), a wholly--owned company of the South African Government; Kentron (Pty.) Ltd. (Kentron); Fuchs Electronics (Pty.) Ltd. (Fuchs); William Randy Metelerkamp; Vern Davis; Brian Scott (a.k.a. “Graham Craighness”); Bert Quinn; Johan Lombard; Jaco Budricks; Gerrit Pretorius (a.k.a. “Bull”); i any divisions, subsidiaries, associated companies, affiliated persons, or successor entities [t. 59, Federal Register, s. 33811, June 30, 1994].
  • Federal Register, s. 51734, October 15, 1991.
  • Defendants may have been involved in other cases involving exports from the United States to South Africa that were sanctioned by the US government, in particular US intelligence agencies. These sanctioned cases were not prosecuted by the United States; only the non--sanctioned ones.
  • wywiad z senior Armscor official, August 4, 1994.
  • See Federal Register notice na https://www.federalregister.gov/ articles/2004/07/21/04-16588/bureau--of--political--military--affairs--rescission--of-- statutory--debarment--and--reinstatement--of#h-4
  • SAPA, “Armscor Threatens ‘Disgruntled Scientists with Prosecution,” Johannesburg Business Day, March 30, 1994.
  • The Citizen, March 28, 1994.
  • wywiad z senior Armscor official, March 30, 1994.
  • Facsimile from Gideon J. Smith, Armscor, to David Albright, “Non-- Proliferation Initiatives,” August 11, 1994.
  • list do Dan Reicher, Deputy Chief of Staff, Office of the Secretary, Department of Energy, from David Albright, President, ISIS, on providing non-- proliferation assistance, May 11, 1994. Zob. też the New York Times editorial “South Africa’s Other Deadly Legacy,” May 12, 1994, which recommended joint US/South African projects to put the skills of bomb builders to peaceful uses.
  • André Buys, Proliferation Risk Assessment of Former Nuclear Explosives/ Weapons Program Personnel: The South African Case Study, University of Pretoria, Graduate School of Technology Management, July 21, 2007.
  • The complicated tale of the Khan network is only briefly summarized here. The interested reader is referred to Peddling Peril, dz. cyt. A variety of Khan network reports i related documents can be found na stronie ISIS na http://isis--online.org/peddlingperil.
  • The State vs. Daniel Geiges, Gerhard Wisser, i Krisch Engineering Co limited, “Summary of Substantial Facts,” High Court of South Africa, bez daty. http://isis--online.org/uploads/conferences/documents/SouthAf_Court_summary. pdf
  • wywiad z former senior AEC official, June 3, 2009.
  • AEC Press Release by J.W.L. de Villiers, January 31, 1984.
  • Peddling Peril, dz. cyt., s. 103-104.

Rozdział 12. Inwentarz wysoko wzbogaconego uranu

Highly Enriched Uranium Inventory

  • transkrypcja wystąpienia Waldo Stumpf, South African Embassy, Washington, D.C., July 23, 1993; i wywiad z US State Department official, January 1997.
  • “A Bungled Nuclear Deal,” Newsweek, July 25, 1994.
  • David Albright i Mark Hibbs, “South Africa: The ANC i the Atom Bomb,” Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, April 1993.
  • J. W. de Villiers, Roger Jardine, i Mitchell Reiss, “Why South Africa Gave Up the Bomb,” Foreign Affairs, November/December 1993, s. 11.
  • Zob. na przykład: Stumpf, Transcript of talk na South African embassy, dz. cyt.
  • “Protocol Discussions between the AEC of South Africa i the RERTR Program na Argonne National Laboratory i the US Department of Energy,” Pelindaba, South Africa, September 8-10, 1993.
  • G. Ball of AEC i R. Pond, N. Hanan, i J. Matos of Argonne National Laboratory, “Technical Feasibility Study of Converting Safari-1 to LEU Silicide Fuel,” Argonne National Laboratory, ANL/RERTR/TM-21, May 1995.
  • G. Ball i F. J. Malherbe, “Techno--Economic Study on Conversion of Safari-1 to LEU Silicide Fuel,” Atomic Energy Corporation (referat przedstawiony podczas 18th International Meeting on Reduced Enrichment for Research i Test Reactors, Paris, September 1995).
  • NESCA, komunikat prasowy: Nuclear reactor uses only low enriched uranium (LEU) for the first time,” South African Nuclear Energy Corporation, June 29, 2009.
  • US Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) export license XSNM3643, which was approved in 2012, i permits the export of 975 kilograms of 19.95 percent LEU for use in Safari fuel i targets.
  • G. Ball i O. Knoesen, “Status Update on Conversion to LEU Based 99Mo Production in South Africa,” RERTR 2011-33rd International Meeting, October 23-27, 2011.
  • Zob. na przykład: Peter Fabricius, “SA playing both sides of the nuclear coin,” The Star, March 30, 2012.
  • David Albright, Highly Enriched Uranium Inventories in South Africa Status as of end of 2014 (Washington, D.C.: Institute for Science i International Security, November 16, 2015). http://isis--online.org/uploads/isis--reports/ documents/Highly_Enriched_Uranium_Inventories_in_South_Africa_ November_2015.pdf. Zob. na przykład: Peter Fabricius, “SA playing both sides of the nuclear coin,” dz. cyt.
  • Highly Enriched Uranium Inventories in South Africa Status as of end of 2014, dz. cyt.

Rozdział 13. Wnioski na dziś

Lessons for Today

  • Frank V. Pabian, “The South African Denuclearization Exemplar,” Nonproliferation Review, 2015, t. 22, nr 1, s. 27-52. http://dx.doi.org/10.108 0/10736700.2015.1071969
  • Zob. na przykład: Waldo Stumpf, “South Africa’s Nuclear Weapons Program: From Deterrence to Dismantlement,” Arms Control Today, December 1995/ January 1996. Here, he downplays the sophistication i deliverability of the weapons i the nuclear strategy. That he likely knew differently is confirmed by a statement of Nic von Wielligh in his book The Bomb [Nic von Wielligh i Lydia von Wielligh--Steyn, The Bomb (Pretoria: Litera Publications, 2014), s. 513.] The authors write that von Wielligh had obtained the set of official documents w back of his book, which discuss missile delivery of nuclear devices, the more detailed nuclear strategy, i plans to expand the arsenal, from the AEC i Armscor “at the time of the IAEA’s investigation of South Africa’s nuclear weapons programme.” Given that von Wielligh reported directly to Stumpf i both interacted heavily with Armscor i the IAEA, these omissions in such journals as Arms Control Today must have been deliberate.
  • Więcej lektur o preventing illicit nuclear procurement, see David Albright, Houston Wood, i Andrea Stricker, Future World of Illicit Nuclear Trade: Mitigating the Threat (Washington, D.C.: Institute for Science i International Security, July 29, 2013). http://isis--online.org/uploads/isis--reports/ documents/Full_Report_DTRA--PASCC_29July2013-FINAL.pdf
  • The Bomb, dz. cyt. s. 281.
  • wywiad z Buys, April 4, 2011.

Ćwiczenia praktyczne

Pierwsze ćwiczenie: odczytaj ten tekst jako źródło wtórne o programie RPA. Wypisz trzy twierdzenia faktograficzne i przy każdym zaznacz, czy dotyczą materiału, organizacji programu, decyzji politycznej czy procesu demontażu.

Drugie ćwiczenie: porównaj opis programu RPA z publicznymi materiałami IAEA o weryfikacji. Zapisz, które informacje są potwierdzane przez inspekcję i rozliczenie materiału, a które pozostają rekonstrukcją historyczną.

Trzecie ćwiczenie: przygotuj tabelę zdolność, ograniczenie, źródło. Ma ona pokazać, że przypadek RPA jest jednocześnie historią proliferacji, dobrowolnego rollbacku i późniejszej weryfikacji, a nie prostą opowieścią o samej konstrukcji urządzeń.

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